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PRESERVING THE FOUNDATION OF LIBERTY
C. L. "BUTCH" OTTER* & ELIZABETH BARKER BRANDT**
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among
old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun
beam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the
divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal
powler.
-Alexander Hamilton'
Foundations are supposed to be steadfast. The very idea of a
foundation is to provide a pinion between the fixed and the tran-
sient, the permanent and the temporary. The foundation is the
unalterable base upon which to build. So it is with our Constitu-
tion and Bill of Rights. They are the rock upon which we have
built our modern republic, while protecting the individual from
the government itself. For more than two centuries, they have
provided the firm foundation of liberty and opportunity from
which America and its people have taken wing, enjoying success
and weathering failure, celebrating triumph and mourning
tragedy. 2
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, forgetting
our past and fearing our future, Congress began turning that
foundation on its head, acting as if physical security requires the
* United States Representative, First District of Idaho.
** James E. Rogers Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Idaho
College of Law.
1. Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted (Feb. 23, 1775), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 122 (H. Syrett ed., 1961) (emphasis
omitted).
2. The debate about the role to be played by the intent of the Framers in
constitutional interpretation has been significant in recent years. Some legal
scholars have argued that the Framers' intentions place limits on the scope of
constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, TiIE TEMPTING OF
AMERiCA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw (1990). Others have suggested
a less-restrictive interpretive approach to the Framers' intentions, arguing that
the Constitution is a living document that must respond to the needs of the
times. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Constitutional Intentions of the Framers: The
Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 349 (1989). The co-authors of
this essay approach the Constitution from opposite sides of this interpretive
divide. Regardless of whether the Framers' intentions are viewed as the primary
interpretive mechanism or as a foundational interpretive mechanism, the
importance of those intentions to our modem understanding of the document
is profound.
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sacrifice of individual rights to government imperatives. While
paying lip service to our heritage of limited government and indi-
vidual liberty, we began acting as if individual rights are condi-
tional, derived not from God nor inherent in the human
condition, but subject to the collective expression of our fears.
Worst of all, we convinced ourselves we were doing nothing of
the kind, or that the manifest benefit of a safer society was worth
risking the loss of individual liberties.
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act'just weeks after the
September 11 attacks, while the dead from the World Trade
Center towers in Manhattan, the Pentagon in Washington, and
from Flight 93 in Pennsylvania were still being buried.4 An
anthrax threat, assumed by many at the time to be another ter-
rorist attack, had forced members of Congress out of their
offices.5 Few, if any, lawmakers were truly aware of the new and
expanded law enforcement authority within the PATRIOT Act.
They only knew that they had to do something to quiet the pub-
lic's fears, and their own. 6
This was not an executive order from a president reacting to
a concrete and immediate threat.7 This was not the temporary
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT or
PATRIOT Act].
4. See generally Clyde Haberman, New legal Powers, Fresh Anthrax Worries,
R..ililent Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at BI (reporting on the circum-
stances surrounding the signing of the PATRIOT Act into law); Eric Lipton,
Numbers Vary in Tallies of the Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at B1 (reporting
on the ongoing tally of the dead and missing in the World Trade Center
attack).
5. See Todd S. Purdum, More Checked For Anthrax: U.S. Officials Acknowledge
Underestimating Mail Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at Al (quoting President
Bush as saying that the nation was "still under attack").
6. Id. As noted earlier, work on the PATRIOT Act was completed during
an anthrax scare that moved many legislators out of their offices and was
believed to be another terror attack. Id. The result was a bill adopted in an
extremely short period of time with little or no open congressional delibera-
tion. The 402 page act, which amends over thirty sections of the U.S. Code and
adds a number of new sections, was signed into law forty-five days after the
September 11 attacks, without a single public hearing.
7. There has been much criticism regarding heavy-handed use of execu-
tive authority even during times of national emergency. See generally ARTHUR
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). See alsoJohn Dean, The His-
tory of and Challenges to, Presidential Lawmaking: Why the Bush Administration's Use
of Executive Orders is Nothing Novel, FINDLAw'S LEGAL COMMENTARY (Dec. 21,
2001), at http://writ.findlaw.com/dean/20011221.html (on file with the NotreDame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). Nonetheless, executive orders
are generally viewed as a more temporal and limited response than legislation.
This view appears to be rooted in the notion that executive orders need only
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imposition of martial law in response to a natural disaster or mili-
tary assault.8 This was the world's greatest deliberative body hast-
ily enacting an incredibly detailed, complex, and comprehensive
piece of legislation without all the facts.9 That haste and lack of
deliberation left advocates backfilling many of the arguments in
support of certain provisions of the law that now appear to be
glaringly at odds with constitutional principles.
I. CONSTITurIONAL FOUNDATIONS
The Framers of our Constitution drew on an extensive body
of law and tradition to recognize certain rights were inaliena-
ble-they transcended the power of government. The colonists
who fostered the tree of liberty recognized that individual rights
were its taproot. The notion that "a man's home is his castle," a
place free from the intrusion of government, was a time-honored
theme-part of both the Code of Hammurabi ° and the pro-
nouncements of the Roman Emperor Justinian. 1I This notion
was one of the inalienable rights with which Englishmen were
thought endowed and which the English barons sought to pro-
last as long as a particular presidential administration as they can be revoked
unilaterally by a new administration. See generally Tara L. Branum, President or
King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1
(2002) (examining the continuing controversy surrounding the proper nature
of executive power and the limitations that should be placed upon it, especially
in regard to the issuance of executive orders).
8. During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas
corpus in 1861 and 1862. J.G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 301-07 (2d ed. 1961). During World War II, President Frank-
lin Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1942 authorizing internment of
120,000 individuals (including many United States citizens) of Japanese ances-
try on the West Coast of the United States. See Exec. Order 9906, 7 Fed. Reg.
1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). The extraordinary measure of declaring martial law has
been taken only a few times in the history of our country, and even then, under
questionable constitutional authority and with much criticism. See Harry N.
Shreiber & Jane L. Shreiber, Bayonets In Paradise: A Half-Centuy Retrospect on
Martial Law in Hawaii, 1941-1946, 19 HAwAn L. REV. 477, 480 (1997); see also
Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. REv. 67
(2000) (setting forth a comprehensive overview of the definition, application,
use, and constitutional and practical controversy of martial law in the United
States). Even despite controversy, declarations of martial law have been short
lived and temporary, revocable by the Executive unilaterally.
9. See supra note 6.
10. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI KING or BABYLON ABOUT 2250 B.C. § 21
(Robert Francis Harper trans., Law Book Exchange 2d ed. 1999) (1904) ("If a
man makes a breach in a house, they shall put him to death in front of that
breach and they shall thrust him therein.").
11. R.W. LEE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE INSTI-
TUTES OF JUSTINIAN (4th ed. 1956).
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tect, through the Magna Carta, from the ad hoc interference of
King John.1 2
The concept of inalienable rights infused the colonists'
understanding of liberty. It can be seen in diverse writings, from
Patrick Henry's rousing appeal for self-determination in the Par-
sons' Cause case of 176313 to the claim of the Declaration of
Independence that "all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights ....
More than a desire for independence or equality, the idea that
made America a reality and continues to make America great is
that individual rights are God-given and unalienable and that
government should be neither more nor less than man's collec-
tive expression of those rights. That is the contract, the founda-
tion upon which America was imagined. It is designed to protect
individuals-their persons, homes, property, speech, worship,
associations, and privacy-from the tyranny of government by
the majority.
Yet, the Fourth Amendment reflected more than a genera-
lized notion of inalienable rights. It was a specific response to
the British government's pre-constitutional violation of colonists'
individual rights through the use of "Writs of Assistance." The
writs were general, universal, perpetual, and transferable search
warrants used to enforce smuggling laws so the cash-strapped
British crown could wring revenue from the colonies to satisfy
the crushing debt of a worldwide empire. They authorized "all
12. The Magna Carta did not directly confer rights; it protected the rights
of Englishmen-rights not conferred by the state, but pre-existing the state and
above the law of the state. Interestingly, the Magna Carta did not directly
address search and seizure. Rather, it was an attempt to limit the power of the
Monarch to interfere unilaterally with unnamed and presumably transcendent
rights of Englishmen. It is one of the early sources of the notion of substantive
due process. See generally SAMUEL DASH, THE INTRUDERS: UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES FROM KING JOHN TO JOHN ASHCROFr (2004) (describing
a recent discussion of the Magna Carta and its role in the development of
search and seizure law); see also SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 22 (Richard L. Perry
ed., 1959). It was understood by the Framers of the United States Constitution
as a protection of inalienable rights against the power of the king. See Thomas
B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 747, 760 (2001); see alsoJane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L.
Rev. 1, 45 (1992).
13. STEPHAN B. PRESSER &JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 52-54 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the cases collectively known
as the "Parsons' Cause"). The cases involved resistance to British authority dis-
approving of the lowering of clergy salaries by the Virginia Colonial legislature.
Henry argued for the legitimacy of the Virginia enactment based on the con-
sent of the people of Virginia to be governed by the colonial legislature. Id.
14. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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and singular justices, sheriffs, constables, and all other officers
and subjects" to enter homes and businesses at will-ostensibly in
search of smuggled items-and to seize virtually any property
without accounting or recompense. 1 5 Writs of Assistance bla-
tantly disregarded personal privacy and offended basic civil liber-
ties, as they were understood by colonial times. Not only were
the writs broad and intrusive but many of the colonists believed
they had been outlawed in Britain-that only the colonists were
subject to such intrusions.1 6
The infringement on personal privacy and property rights
represented by the Writs of Assistance was so outrageous that, in
1761, it prompted Boston attorney James Otis, a loyal officer of
King George III, to resign his position as an advocate general in
the vice admiralty court.17 Subsequently, he was commissioned
by Boston merchants to make their case against renewal of the
writs. Otis's stirring five-hour argument indicted the expansion
of government authority in violation of the individual rights of
British subjects. "It appears to me (may it please your honours)
the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever
was found in an English law-book."" Otis's argument in the
Writs of Assistance case hinged on several major points, one of
which was the invocation of the ancient notion regarding the
15. For detailed history of the Vice Admiralty Courts, see CARL
UBBELOIIDE, THE VIcE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1960). For a detailed history of the use of Writs of Assistance, see M.H. SMITH,
THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
16. See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (holding gen-
eral warrants issued in Britain were unlawful). The court concluded that the
secretary of state could not "lawfully break into a man's house and study to
search for evidence against him; this would be worse than the Spanish Inquisi-
tion; for ransacking a man's secret drawers and Boxes to come at evidence
against him, is like racking his body to come at his secret thoughts." Id. The
holding in Entick probably only meant that the King did not unilaterally have
the jurisdiction to issue a general warrant, but that the King in council could
issue such warrants. Nonetheless, the opinion, written in grand language, was
understood by some members of Parliament at the time and by the colonists to
be an unequivocal condemnation of general warrants. See DASH, supra note 12,
at 1 (William Pitt declared to Parliament, "The poorest man may in his cottage,
bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake;
the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the
King of England may not enter; all his force dare not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement."); see also DASH, supra note 14, at 26-32.
17. SMITH, supra note 15, at 316-17.
18. Otis's argument in the famous case was not transcribed or reported
but was summarized by John Adams. SeeJohn Adams, Abstract of the Argument, in
2 LEGAL PARERS OF JOHN ADAMS 134, 140 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel
eds., 1965).
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sanctity of the home. 9 Otis argued that householders were
reduced to servants under the writs because their homes were
subject to search at any time: "Now one of the most essential
branches of English liberty is the freedom of one's house. A
man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be
declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege."2
John Adams, then a young lawyer, was in the courtroom tohear Otis's argument. Fifty-six years later, in a letter to a col-
league, the founding father and America's second president
recalled the impassioned defense of liberty as a transcendent
moment on the path to revolution: "Then and there, the child
Independence was born." 21
Also born that day, and reared to maturity by Adams and
many others, was a critical element of America's constitutional
foundation-the commitment to protect "the freedom of one's
house," which became the Fourth Amendment. The idea that
those rights transcend the needs of any particular time and place
is embedded in our jurisprudence. 22 Justice Robert Jackson
wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.23
With those words, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
widely popular practice, adopted in a burst of patriotism during
World War II, of requiring public school students to salute the
19. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REv. 547, 601-02 (1999).
20. SMITH, supra note 15, at 344.
21. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in 10
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247-48 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856).
22. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, the debate over
whether to include an enumerated charter of rights was significant. Many
argued against such inclusion believing that there was no need to enumerate
such transcendent rights when the powers of government were appropriately
limited, and worrying that any such enumeration would be incomplete. They
also believed the people would be protected by the individual states' Bills of
Rights. Others, having just fought a revolution, lacked confidence in govern-
ment's limited powers and sought to enumerate the liberties for which they had
fought. See DASH, supra note 12, at 39-41.
23. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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American flag. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson crystal-
lized the argument for protecting most vigorously the least popu-
lar of our individual rights in the overheated political climate of
the moment. While public displeasure served as a natural
defense of liberty against the Writs of Assistance once Otis
sounded the alarm, the Constitution and Bill of Rights institu-
tionalized protection of minority rights from majority will and
created a foundation for individual liberty. The test of such a
foundation is how firmly it is reinforced against time and tides.
II. "SNEAK-AND-PEEK" WARRANTS PRIOR TO THE USA
PATRIOT ACT
Just as the British crown felt compelled, in the interest of
empire, to sacrifice the rights of citizens remote from the seat of
government, section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, in the name of
fighting terrorism, deprives Americans of the right to be "as well
guarded as a prince in his castle." Section 213 of the PATRIOT
Act greatly expands what already was constitutionally questiona-
ble authority for delayed notification of the execution of search
warrants.
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure established the framework for the execution and
return of warrants. Rule 41 (f) requires that the officer executing
the warrant enter the date and time of its execution on its face.
It further requires that an officer present at the search prepare
and verify an inventory of any property seized. Moreover, Rule
41 (f) provides that the officer executing the warrant "give a copy
of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person
from whom or from whose premises, the property was taken" or
"leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the
officer took the property. "24 Congress recognized an extremely
limited exception to the notification requirements under certain
circumstances where notification would endanger the life or
physical safety of an individual, would result in flight from prose-
cution, destruction of evidence, or intimidation of witnesses, or
would otherwise jeopardize an investigation.
25
24. FED. R. CRM. P. 41(f).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2000). Section 2705 permits notification for
searches involving electronic communications held in third party storage for
more than ninety days where there "is reason to believe that notification of the
existence of the court order may have an adverse result . Id. "Adverse
result" is defined in section 2705 as:
(a) endangering the life and physical safety of an individual;
(b) flight from prosecution;
(c) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
20051
268 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
The case law regarding surreptitious searches was unsettled
at the time the USA PATRIOT Act was adopted. The U.S.
Supreme Court never directly addressed the constitutionality of a
broad surreptitious search provision. In Berger v. New York,26 the
Court struck down New York's wiretapping statute because it
lacked a number of procedural safeguards to limit the intrusive-
ness of wiretapping. Among the statute's deficiencies was that it
had no requirement for notice. And, in contrast to other wire-
tapping statutes, the New York provision did not make up for this
deficiency by requiring a showing of exigent circumstances tojus-
tify the lack of notice. 2 7 However, in Dalia v. United States,28 the
Court refused to hold all surreptitious searches per se unconstitu-
tional. Rather, the Court reasoned that under some circum-
stances, surreptitious searches could be authorized where such
searches were reasonable, such as where they were supported by
a warrant.
29
On this landscape, the federal circuit courts addressed the
constitutionality of delayed notification of searches. In United
States v. Freitas,5 ° the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant that failed
(d) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(e) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delay-
ing a trial.
Id. As pointed out later, these provisions are not an effective limit on the power
to search surreptitiously. The threat of section 2705 is limited, however, by its
scope (only electronic communications stored with third parties). See infra note
49 and accompanying text.
26. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
27. Id. at 60.
28. 441 U.S. 238 (1979). Dalia involved a surreptitious entry to install
hugging devices. Id. The entry was not explicitly authorized in the warrant
although it was implicitly necessary to effectuate the warrant. Id.
29. Id. at 246-47. The Court relied on a number of its earlier decisions,
including Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954) (holding a warrantless
entry to install bugging devices unconstitutional); Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (concluding that the warrantless secret entry into a
home was unconstitutional); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16(1967) (holding that officers need not knock and announce their purpose
when conducting an otherwise authorized search when it would provoke the
escape of the subject or the destruction of critical evidence); United States v.
Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977) (upholding wiretap statute as constitu-
tional where it authorized notice upon completion of surveillance).
30. 800 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Johns,
948 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the failure to provide notice of
search until conclusion of investigation violated Rule 41 and the Constitution
but was excused because officers acted in good faith); United States v. Sitton,
968 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that search violated standard of Freitas,
but was excused by the good faith of the officers). The surreptitious warrants in
both Johns and Sitton were issued before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Freitas,
leading, in part, to the good faith determinations in both cases.
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to provide for notice within a "reasonable, but short time" after
the surreptitious entry was constitutionally defective."1 The Frei-
tas court held that a delay in notification should not exceed
seven days, except when supported by a "strong showing of
necessity." 2
Even courts upholding delayed notification of search war-
rants have imposed significant limitations on such searches. In
United States v. Villegas," the Second Circuit reasoned:
Though we believe that certain safeguards are required
where the entry is to be covert and only intangible evi-
dence is to be seized, we conclude that appropriate condi-
tions were imposed in this case. Certain types of searches
or surveillances depend for their success on the absence of
premature disclosure. The use of a wiretap or a "bug," or a
pen register, or a video camera would likely produce little
evidence of wrongdoing if the wrongdoers knew in
advance that their conversations or actions would be moni-
tored. When non-disclosure of the authorized search is
essential to its success, neither Rule 41 nor the Fourth
Amendment prohibits covert entry.
3 4
The Second Circuit determined that a number of safeguards
applied to surreptitious searches. First, the court noted that if
tangible evidence was seized during the search, officers must
leave an inventory of the property taken at the location or must
provide the inventory to the owner of the searched premises.
3 5
Additionally, the court concluded that, with regard to electronic
surveillance, the requirements of federal wiretapping laws pro-
vided significant safeguards.3 6 The court further reasoned that
the safeguards of the federal wiretapping statute -also apply by
analogy to video surveillance. 37 Even with regard to surreptitious
entries in which no tangible property is seized, the Second Cir-
cuit held that law enforcement officers must establish that there
is a reasonable necessity for the delay of notice and must provide
31. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1453.
32. Id. at 1456.
33. 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990).
34. Id. at 1336.
35. Id. at 1337.
36. Id. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000), provides for a number of safeguards: the period of
surveillance must be no longer than necessary, the surveillance techniques must
minimize the interception of communications by individuals not targets of the
surveillance, and an inventory of the surveillance must be provided within
ninety days of the end of the surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
37. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337.
2005]
270 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
notice within a reasonable, but short, period of time after the
search.3 8 Although the Villegas court did not adopt the seven-day
limitation of Freitas, the court did conclude that, as an initial mat-
ter, delays of longer than seven days should not be authorized.39
While there is a paucity of case law on the general question
of whether and when notice of the execution of a search is
required, significant authority also establishes the closely related
notion that law enforcement officials must knock and announce
themselves before executing a search warrant. Even before
American independence, British law required law enforcement
officials to knock and announce themselves before executing a
search warrant.40 The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that whether law enforcement officers knock and
announce themselves is a factor to be considered in determining
whether a search is reasonable.4 1 The Court's reasoning was
based substantially on the notion that government officials must
38. The court specifically reasoned that the showing of necessity need not
rise to the level required for a wiretap. Id. By statute, officers are required to
certify that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18
U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).
39. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337; see also United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d
392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (" [I] nsofar as the . . . [search] satisfied the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., it was conducted pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, we per-
ceive no basis for concluding that the forty-five day delay in notice rendered the
search unconstitutional."); United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453-55 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding that the notice requirement of Rule 41 is not constitution-
ally required).
40. See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603); see also Craig Hem-
mons, I Hear You Knocking: The Supreme Court Revisits the Knock and Announce
Rule, 66 UMKC L. REv. 559, 566-68 (1998); Charles Patrick Garcia, The Knock
and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 685, 687-91 (1993);Jennifer M. Goddard, Note, The Destruction
of Evidence Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule: A Call for Protection of the
Fourth Amendment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 449, 453-55 (1995).
41. See Williams v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995). Significant debate
exists among various justices of the Supreme Court and scholars regarding
whether the principal command of the Fourth Amendment is that a search is
reasonable (regardless of whether it is supported by a warrant), or whether the
command of the Fourth Amendment is twofold-that searches be both sup-
ported by a warrant and be reasonable. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990); Davies,
supra note 19. Regardless of the debate, only reasonableness is implicated in
both the "knock and announce" cases and the "sneak-and-peck" cases, as both
situations generally arise where law enforcement officials have secured a war-
rant. See also Richardson v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (finding that a state
blanket exception to "knock and announce" rule in drug cases violated the
Fourth Amendment).
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provide notice before entering a person's home. The Court
acknowledged that this notion formed part of the Framers'
understanding of what constituted a reasonable search.4 2 While
the Court has recognized an exigency exception to the "knock
and announce" rule,4 3 it has not overruled it.
Thus, at the time the PATRIOT Act was adopted, no federal
court had authorized unlimited use of "sneak-and-peek" war-
rants. Moreover, even those courts authorizing limited surrepti-
tious entry had placed significant limitations on such searches.
III. "SNEAK-AND-PEEK" WARRANTS UNDER THE USA
PATRIOT ACT
No federal court has ever confronted the virtually unlimited
authority to dispense with notice contained in the PATRIOT Act.
Section 213 eliminates the time limits for notification under
prior federal law, makes judicial review of the necessity of
delayed notification perfunctory and so loosens the standard for
delayed notification as to render it meaningless. It strikes at the
foundation of liberty embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments and at the essential protections of probable cause, due
process, and separation of powers.
Section 213 amends 18 U.S.C. § 3103a to add the following
language:
With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order
under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for
and seize any property or material that constitutes evi-
dence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the
United States, any notice required, or that may be
required, to be given may be delayed if (1) the court finds
reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate noti-
fication of the execution of a warrant may have an adverse
result (as defined in section 2705);44
(2) the warrant prohibits seizure of any tangible property,
any wire or electronic communication (as defined in sec-
tion 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter 121,
42. See Williams, 514 U.S. at 931-34 ("Given the longstanding common-
law endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's
entry to a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of a search.").
43. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967)
("[O]fficers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise
authorized search if such announcement would provoke the escape of the sus-
pect or the destruction of critical evidence.").
44. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2705, see supra note 25.
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any stored wire or electronic information, except where
the court finds reasonable necessity of the seizure; and
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice
within a reasonable period of its execution, which period
may thereafter be extended by the court for good cause
shown.4 5
Section 213 changes prior federal law regarding notification
of searches in several important ways. First, it permits delayed
notification of a search in any case in which the government
demonstrates that one of several adverse factors "may" occur,
regardless of whether the investigation involves terrorism or the
gathering of foreign intelligence. The adverse factors justifying
delayed notice are that notification would endanger the life or
physical safety of an individual, would result in flight from prose-
cution, destruction of evidence, intimidation of witnesses, or
would otherwise jeopardize an investigation or unduly delay a
trial.
46
This standard is so open-ended that these invasive warrants
could be obtained as a matter of course; the government need
only state that notification of a search "may" "seriously jeopard-
ize" an investigation. Although the standard for delay was part of
pre-PATRIOT law, the earlier statute was limited to covert
seizures of electronic communications held in third-party
storage.
The nature of criminal investigation is that unpredictable
things may happen. It is always conceivable that the target of a
search may act in an unpredictable fashion when he or she is
notified of the warrant and thereby jeopardize an investigation.
As a result, section 213 places virtually no limit on "sneak-and-
peek" searches.
The second distinction between the PATRIOT Act and prior
law is that officers may seize tangible property using a covert war-
rant under the PATRIOT Act without leaving an inventory of the
property taken. Thus, the PATRIOT Act actually authorizes
"sneak-and-steal" warrants. The law requires only that the war-
rant "provides for the giving of such notice within a reasonable
period of its execution, which period may thereafter be extended
by the court for good cause shown.""7
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2000 & Supp. I 2001) (incorporating the provi-
sions of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure into federal statu-
tory law). Thus, the new language of section 3103a, added by the PATRIOT
Act, applies to all warrants issued to federal law enforcement officials.
46. See supra note 25.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a; see also supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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Again, prior statutory provisions for delayed notification
applied only to electronic communications in third-party storage.
The cases dealing with delayed notification authorized surrepti-
tious entry but required officers to leave an inventory if property
was taken."8 Although the approach of courts like the Second
Circuit in Villegas, in our view, did not properly limit the use of
"sneak-and-peek" warrants, it is significantly more limited than
the PATRIOT Act approach.
Third, section 213 permits delayed notification even where
the government seizes electronic information, so long as the
court issuing the warrant finds "reasonable necessity" for the
seizure. Thus, if officers get a warrant under federal wiretapping
statutes, they still must comply with a complex set of safe-
guards.49 For all other warrants involving electronic communica-
tions-those involving video or Internet surveillance, for
example-delayed notification under the PATRIOT Act applies.
Fourth, section 213 places no express limit on the length of
the delay. Instead, it authorizes delay for a "reasonable period"
of time and permits extensions of the delay for "good cause
shown." Section 213 opens the door for secret searches
extending over months or even years without the knowledge of
the target of the search. Such delays render notice meaningless.
Although the judge in any particular case may impose a specific
deadline by which notice must be given, the statute does not
require such a deadline. Where the warrant itself does not
impose specific time limits,judicial review of the necessity of con-
tinuing delay in notification is impaired. No concrete timeframe
triggers a governmental duty to justify continued delay. Because
the target of the search is, by definition, unaware of the search,
he or she cannot be expected to seek review of the need for con-
tinued delay. Courts would have the opportunity to review the
necessity of delay only after the fact, while also under the pres-
sure to prosecute and admit evidence obtained through the
notice-less search.
Finally, section 213 extends the availability of "sneak-and-
peek" warrants far beyond the PATRIOT Act's stated purpose of
fighting terrorism. The provision contains no limitation on the
types of cases in which a covert warrant could be used.
CONCLUSION
The threatening nature of section 213 is not obvious, and
thus, it is more dangerous to the cause of preserving liberty. If
48. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 36.
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the public is blinded by fear of terrorism or ignorance of what is
at risk, section 213 has the potential to become the insidious
mechanism of steady but discernible erosion in the foundation
of our freedoms. Section 213 takes the exception and makes it
the rule-in fact, makes it the law of the land. It gives broad
statutory authority to secret searches in virtually any criminal
case. Even if the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of
such practices, Congress can-and should-limit them by stat-
ute. In such cases, justice delayed truly is justice denied.
Terrorism is a scourge that must be addressed. Government
has a fundamental duty to protect its people from enemies, for-
eign or domestic. Fear of terrorism, or anything else, deprives us
of free choice as surely as does tyranny; indeed, terrorism is an
instrument of tyranny. We must not, however, allow fear to
erode the constitutional foundation of our freedom. We can no
more gain real security by being less free than we can gain wealth
or wisdom or anything else of value. No such trade-off is possi-
ble. That is the definition of "unalienable"-rights with which
we were endowed by our Creator, and which therefore cannot be
repudiated or transferred to another. Our Constitution recog-
nizes that higher law, and we ignore it at our peril.
We now are engaged in a national crisis, an unconventional
war in which our surreptitious enemies use the camouflage of a
free society's commitment to privacy and diversity to achieve
their goals. Our government is justified in adapting its law
enforcement methods to the new threat, but we must take care to
ensure those methods are consistent with the timeless principles
of our founding.5" To do less is to sanction a dangerous expan-
sion of governmental authority and a corresponding reduction
of personal privacy.
Our body of laws serves as both a connecting mortar and a
protective barrier between the foundation of our Constitution
and the structure of our government. Laws are necessary for
applying constitutional principles to the endless variety of every-
50. A narrowly tailored response to the current crisis could be crafted.
For example, the proposed Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003 (SAFE
Act), S. 1709, 108th Cong. (2003), would permit delayed notification, but only
where the government demonstrates that notice of the search "will" result in
endangering the life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution,
destruction of evidence or intimidation of witnesses, or will otherwise seriously
impair the investigation or delay trial. Moreover, the SAFE Act requires that
notice be provided within seven days of the search. SAFE Act, S. 1709, § 3.
Another possible approach would be to limit "sneak-and-peek" searches only to
terrorism investigations and/or to provide the power to delay notification of a
search until some time in the future when the current crisis has passed.
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day life. Theyjoin the abstract and the concrete. They enable us
to safely explore our freedom and realize the potential of liberty.
However, when laws reach beyond limits imposed by the
Constitution, when they grant too much power to government
and too little deference to the source of that power, they cease to
connect or protect. If unchecked, these laws can destroy the
foundation of individual rights. Proponents contend that we
have nothing to fear from section 213 or any other provision of
the PATRIOT Act. This may be true, as long as the public is as
vigilant as the American colonists were after Otis inflamed their
passions regarding the Writs of Assistance. But can we trust that
the law will be used as judiciously, with as much care to protect-
ing civil liberties, once the public's attention has turned to other
matters?
The concern is not new or unique to the PATRIOT Act. Few
of our Founding Fathers had greater faith in his fellow man than
Thomas Jefferson. Yet that faith had its limits. In the Kentucky
Resolutions, Jefferson wrote:
[I]t would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in
the men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety of
our rights: that confidence is everywhere the parent of des-
potism-free government is founded in jealousy, and not
in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which
prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom
we are obliged to trust with power: that our Constitution
has accordingly fixed the limits to which, and no further,
our confidence may go .... 51
Due process. Probable cause. Those are the constitutional
limits within which we "bind down those whom we are obliged to
trust with power" and preserve our individual rights. A law that
sets those limits aside, or obfuscates them in vague statutory lan-
guage and legalistic definitions, has the potential for eroding the
foundation of freedom as surely as terrorists have the potential
for breaching the ramparts of our security. An informed people
and a vigilant and responsive Congress are the keys to guarantee-
ing that our rights to security and freedom are ensured. They
are essential to protecting the foundation of liberty and preserv-
ing each individual's God-given role as the architect of his or her
own destiny. As John Stuart Mill warned:
A people may prefer a free government, but if, from indo-
lence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public
51. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Resolutions Relative to the Alien and Sedition Laws, in
17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 379, 388-89 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al.
eds., 1905).
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spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for pre-
serving it; if they will not fight for it when it is directly
attacked; if they can be deluded by the artifices used to
cheat them out of it; if by momentary discouragement, or
temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual,
they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of
a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to
subvert their institutions; in all these cases they are more
or less unfit for liberty.
5 2
52. JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, reprinted
in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOV-
ERNMENT 191 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972).
